My class schedule for Spring semester:
Medieval Philosophy
Contemporary Philosophy
Ancient Greek II
General Science (ah the joys of required classes)
Philosophy/Theology of Ethics, War, and Peace
Independent Study on St. Augustine
Should be another good semester, I think.
04 December 2008
08 October 2008
C.S. Lewis on Affection
C.S. Lewis’ The Four Loves is an exploration of the nature of love, dealing it particular with four categories of love. One such category which is that called “affection”. Lewis initially defines Affection with the example of mother’s love towards a child and also a child’s love towards a mother. Though such a definition seems simple enough, he also focuses on a paradox which makes the reader question the seeming simplicity of Affection. Lewis remarks in the beginning of the chapter, “It is a Need-love but what it needs is to give. It is a Gift-love but it needs to be needed” (32). After qualifying some specifications for Affection, Lewis explores the truth of the aforementioned paradox.
It is important to note that Lewis specifies familiarity as a set criterion for Affection. This importance will not be further explored within this essay, but it ought to be kept in the back of our minds as we enter into the paradox of Need-love and Gift-love as found present in Affection.
Lewis first addresses Need-love in relation to Affection. “Almost anyone may be the object of Affection” says Lewis. “Yes; and almost everyone expects to be” (39). The truth of this statement seems to be self-evident. Lewis provides the reader with examples from different literary works (King Lear, The Way of All Flesh), but also comments that these example can be found in people from our own lives. We, as humans, are filled with this sense of “right” when it comes to Affection. But Lewis would further refine such a statement, saying rather, “What we have is not ‘a right to expect’ but a ‘reasonable expectation’ of being loved” (40). It seems that the point Lewis is attempting to make by this restatement is that humans tend to pervert Affection when they begin to view it as a right. Instead, it is something that we can reasonably expect if “we, and they [our intimates, those from whom we desire affection], are more or less ordinary people” (40). It seems that the implication is that Affection, as a Need-love, can be a perversion which leads something which is not love at all. Lewis makes this point with jealousy as well, commenting that Affection can to and is often times the basis for jealousy.
Perversions to Affection are not limited to Need-love, however, for there are certainly perversions in the realm of Gift-love as well. To make this point, Lewis depicts an over-bearing mother who “gives” to her children and family to an extent of foolishness. She waits up for them when they are out late, cooks hot dinners every night, insists on doing their laundry (despite her inability of doing it well)—all of which drive those on the receiving end crazy. It is excessive and to such an extent, annoying. Lewis points out that, while this mother is certainly giving, she needs to give it. She “needs to be needed” (50). In this sense, it seems, Gift-love is also Need-love, for it must be given.
From these two perversions, the perversion of Need-love and of Gift-love, in the realm of Affection, it would almost appear that Lewis is attempting to say that Affection is not a love, that it is not good. Lewis even allows for this objection himself when he quotes an imaginary objector, “Selfish or neurotic people can twist anything, even love, into some sort of misery or exploitation” (53). The point that Lewis is making, however, is that Affection cannot be on its own. He says, “Affection produces happiness if—and only if—there is common sense and give and take and ‘decency’” (54). There must be something more than mere Affection. By noting the perversions of Affection, Lewis is essentially saying (which he does indeed state explicitly at the end of the chapter), “If we try to live by Affection alone, Affection will ‘go bad on us’” (55).
Lewis’ main point in all of this is that Affection is not the end all—there is more to Love than simply Affection. Not even that there exists more to Love than simply Affection, but that there necessarily must be more to Love than Affection.
It is important to note that Lewis specifies familiarity as a set criterion for Affection. This importance will not be further explored within this essay, but it ought to be kept in the back of our minds as we enter into the paradox of Need-love and Gift-love as found present in Affection.
Lewis first addresses Need-love in relation to Affection. “Almost anyone may be the object of Affection” says Lewis. “Yes; and almost everyone expects to be” (39). The truth of this statement seems to be self-evident. Lewis provides the reader with examples from different literary works (King Lear, The Way of All Flesh), but also comments that these example can be found in people from our own lives. We, as humans, are filled with this sense of “right” when it comes to Affection. But Lewis would further refine such a statement, saying rather, “What we have is not ‘a right to expect’ but a ‘reasonable expectation’ of being loved” (40). It seems that the point Lewis is attempting to make by this restatement is that humans tend to pervert Affection when they begin to view it as a right. Instead, it is something that we can reasonably expect if “we, and they [our intimates, those from whom we desire affection], are more or less ordinary people” (40). It seems that the implication is that Affection, as a Need-love, can be a perversion which leads something which is not love at all. Lewis makes this point with jealousy as well, commenting that Affection can to and is often times the basis for jealousy.
Perversions to Affection are not limited to Need-love, however, for there are certainly perversions in the realm of Gift-love as well. To make this point, Lewis depicts an over-bearing mother who “gives” to her children and family to an extent of foolishness. She waits up for them when they are out late, cooks hot dinners every night, insists on doing their laundry (despite her inability of doing it well)—all of which drive those on the receiving end crazy. It is excessive and to such an extent, annoying. Lewis points out that, while this mother is certainly giving, she needs to give it. She “needs to be needed” (50). In this sense, it seems, Gift-love is also Need-love, for it must be given.
From these two perversions, the perversion of Need-love and of Gift-love, in the realm of Affection, it would almost appear that Lewis is attempting to say that Affection is not a love, that it is not good. Lewis even allows for this objection himself when he quotes an imaginary objector, “Selfish or neurotic people can twist anything, even love, into some sort of misery or exploitation” (53). The point that Lewis is making, however, is that Affection cannot be on its own. He says, “Affection produces happiness if—and only if—there is common sense and give and take and ‘decency’” (54). There must be something more than mere Affection. By noting the perversions of Affection, Lewis is essentially saying (which he does indeed state explicitly at the end of the chapter), “If we try to live by Affection alone, Affection will ‘go bad on us’” (55).
Lewis’ main point in all of this is that Affection is not the end all—there is more to Love than simply Affection. Not even that there exists more to Love than simply Affection, but that there necessarily must be more to Love than Affection.
18 September 2008
Update
Unfortunately I don't have any particular 'philosophical' thoughts for the night, but I do figure I ought to at least post an update on my philosophy classes in general.
Ancient philosophy is going well. We have just finished studying the Monists, Pluralists, and Atomists. We're now heading to the Sophists. It's been interesting. I think Heraclitus and Empedocles are my favorites so far.
Love and Friendship is perhaps one of the most amazing classes I have ever taken in my life. We read and discuss. That's it. It's nice.
One of these days I will post some 'musings' I've had as of late. Unfortunately, my brain is now fried and I doubt I could string together any coherent thoughts.
Ancient philosophy is going well. We have just finished studying the Monists, Pluralists, and Atomists. We're now heading to the Sophists. It's been interesting. I think Heraclitus and Empedocles are my favorites so far.
Love and Friendship is perhaps one of the most amazing classes I have ever taken in my life. We read and discuss. That's it. It's nice.
One of these days I will post some 'musings' I've had as of late. Unfortunately, my brain is now fried and I doubt I could string together any coherent thoughts.
17 August 2008
Philosophy Courses for Fall 2008
The courses I will be taking this fall semester:
Ancient Philosophy
Love and Friendship (Philosophy elective)
Beginning Greek I
Foundations of Theology
History of Art
I'm especially looking forward to my two philosophy courses. Ancient philosophy will obviously deal with the pre-socratics, Plato, and I think a bit of Socrates. Plus, Love and Friendship is going to be amazing. We're reading C.S. Lewis, Plato, and JPII. Greek will be good to have and I'm looking forward to having a foreign language class again. My Theology course will be good as well. The only course I'm a little unsure about the History of Art course, but I think it will be a good experience for me.
Classes begin in just over a week. The scholar in me is feeling the excitement that is unique to the beginning of a new school year. I have high hopes for this semester. Nevermind the fact that I am in class with a bunch of graduate students. I can compete. The philosophy department is mine. Cocky? Maybe just a little bit.
Ancient Philosophy
Love and Friendship (Philosophy elective)
Beginning Greek I
Foundations of Theology
History of Art
I'm especially looking forward to my two philosophy courses. Ancient philosophy will obviously deal with the pre-socratics, Plato, and I think a bit of Socrates. Plus, Love and Friendship is going to be amazing. We're reading C.S. Lewis, Plato, and JPII. Greek will be good to have and I'm looking forward to having a foreign language class again. My Theology course will be good as well. The only course I'm a little unsure about the History of Art course, but I think it will be a good experience for me.
Classes begin in just over a week. The scholar in me is feeling the excitement that is unique to the beginning of a new school year. I have high hopes for this semester. Nevermind the fact that I am in class with a bunch of graduate students. I can compete. The philosophy department is mine. Cocky? Maybe just a little bit.
01 August 2008
Natural Attitude
The "Natural Attitude" defines belief as "the manner in which we accept the things in the world, and the world itself" (Kolokowski 45).
The skeptic would obviously scoff at even such a concept as belief, although might I say I find that slightly hypocritical-- a skeptic holds to a philosophical belief which says that for every proposition there is contradictory one that is also conceivably true. Well, by that thinking, there is a philosophy that is contrary to that of skepticism, which by skepticism thinking, is also conceivably true.
But I digress.
Phenomenology, in its defining of the "Natural Attitude", offers a rather suprising argument to the skepticism of Sextus Empericus. Rather than progressing with the familiar 'cogito argument' (which, by the way, was first found in St. Augustine, long before Descartes penned it), it argues for an a priori knowledge of the world.
Sokolowski comments, "Even the most rudimentary sense of self could not arise except on the bases of world belief" (46).
[It is important to note that when we speak of the 'world' we speak not of the globe or a large physical thing, but rather "the ultimate setting for ourselves and for all the things we experience" (44).]
He then supplies an argument for his point. I will not further analyze his actual argument, but rather comment on the signifigance of his conclusion.
If it is indeed so that 'world belief' comes prior to an ego-centric belief, then we truly are a part to the world, and even more, a moment to the world. The world is then something bigger than ourselves, but not dependent on our own existance (even though our existance is dependent upon the world's existance).
This would be a direct contradiction to any sort of relativism. If we are dependent on the world and the world is not dependent upon us, then it is impossible for the world to be subjective to our own minds in an absolute sense. There necessarily must be an objective state to the world.
An interesting connection, I think, and one that I would like to dive deeper into.
The skeptic would obviously scoff at even such a concept as belief, although might I say I find that slightly hypocritical-- a skeptic holds to a philosophical belief which says that for every proposition there is contradictory one that is also conceivably true. Well, by that thinking, there is a philosophy that is contrary to that of skepticism, which by skepticism thinking, is also conceivably true.
But I digress.
Phenomenology, in its defining of the "Natural Attitude", offers a rather suprising argument to the skepticism of Sextus Empericus. Rather than progressing with the familiar 'cogito argument' (which, by the way, was first found in St. Augustine, long before Descartes penned it), it argues for an a priori knowledge of the world.
Sokolowski comments, "Even the most rudimentary sense of self could not arise except on the bases of world belief" (46).
[It is important to note that when we speak of the 'world' we speak not of the globe or a large physical thing, but rather "the ultimate setting for ourselves and for all the things we experience" (44).]
He then supplies an argument for his point. I will not further analyze his actual argument, but rather comment on the signifigance of his conclusion.
If it is indeed so that 'world belief' comes prior to an ego-centric belief, then we truly are a part to the world, and even more, a moment to the world. The world is then something bigger than ourselves, but not dependent on our own existance (even though our existance is dependent upon the world's existance).
This would be a direct contradiction to any sort of relativism. If we are dependent on the world and the world is not dependent upon us, then it is impossible for the world to be subjective to our own minds in an absolute sense. There necessarily must be an objective state to the world.
An interesting connection, I think, and one that I would like to dive deeper into.
18 July 2008
Parts and Wholes
I have come across the concept of "Parts and Wholes" for the first time this afternoon, in reading Introduction to Phenomenology by Robert Sokolowski. According to Msgr. Sokolowski, this concept is not unique only to phenomenology, but found first in Aristotle and Plato. I can only assume that I will encounter "Parts and Wholes" further during my study of Ancient Philosophy next semester.
I must admit, however, that I am suprised that this is my first time hearing of the concept, especially considering my study of Epistemology last spring. Perhaps it's just me, but I see a direct correlation between the theory of "Parts and Wholes" to the epistemological questions. In fact, if Msgr. Sokolowski is correct in his assertion (which I will restate here momentarily), then modern philosophers such as Descarte and Locke have no premise on which to build their arguments. This seems huge to me.
Let's begin with the basic concept of "Parts and Wholes", as explained in Solokowski's book, Chapter 3.
A part can be subdivided into two:
Pieces-- parts that can subsist and be presented even apart from the whole. Parts that can become wholes. Also known as Independent parts.
Moments-- parts that cannot subsist or be presented apart from the whole to which they belong; they cannot be detached. Also known as Nonindependent parts.
Examples of pieces are acorns and leaves and branches. They are parts of whole (a tree), but they also maintain an individual identity when separated from the tree.
Examples of moments are the color red, musical pitch, and vision. The color red cannot occur apart from some surface or spacial expanse. A musical pitch cannot exist except blended with sound, and vision without an eye. Moments can be spoken about, thanks to language, without making reference to its dependences, but they cannot exist alone. Once separated by speech or thouht, they become abstract.
Now for the interesting claim made by Sokolowski. He prefaces this claim by explaining how certain philosophical "problems" arise merely from mistaking moments for pieces. He then states:
People often take the mind to be a self-enclosed sphere, that is, a piece that can be separated from the worldly context to which it naturally and essentially belongs. Then they will ask how the mind can ever get outside itself and find out what is going on in the world. But the mind cannot be separated out this way; the mind is a moment to the world and the things in it; the mind is essentially correlated with its objects. There is no "problem of knowledge" or "problem of the external world," there is no problem about how we get to "extramental" reality, because the mind should never be separated from reality from the beginning (Sokolowski 25).
Now, I'm not entirely convinced of his claim that the "mind is a moment to the world" and I would like to see some backing for it, but I will deal with that issue specifically in an upcoming post.
For the present time, I would like to consider the epistemological implications of such a claim.
The idea that the mind is connected to the world, even more so than simply being able to intend with the world, is an interesting concept. That the mind is a part of the world, even a moment of the world... Where does one start with such a claim?
It seems that, if true, this claim proves wrong all relativism and the thinking of most modern philosophers that the only things that we can have knowledge of are those that are in our minds. By such, they say that we cannot know what is in the outside world. But if the mind is a moment of the world, then there is that steady connection-- that real connection between the mind and the world. A connection that Locke holds does not exist.
I wonder, too, what relation this has with the process of intellection or abstraction. Do these two theories go together? Do they compliment one another, or do they contradict?
How does a part interact with its whole?
I'd like to read more on "Parts and Wholes" in general. And I'd also like to find an argument for the claim that Sokolowski makes about the mind being a moment of the world. This is even more interesting than I originally thought it would be. I need to do some more research.
I must admit, however, that I am suprised that this is my first time hearing of the concept, especially considering my study of Epistemology last spring. Perhaps it's just me, but I see a direct correlation between the theory of "Parts and Wholes" to the epistemological questions. In fact, if Msgr. Sokolowski is correct in his assertion (which I will restate here momentarily), then modern philosophers such as Descarte and Locke have no premise on which to build their arguments. This seems huge to me.
Let's begin with the basic concept of "Parts and Wholes", as explained in Solokowski's book, Chapter 3.
A part can be subdivided into two:
Pieces-- parts that can subsist and be presented even apart from the whole. Parts that can become wholes. Also known as Independent parts.
Moments-- parts that cannot subsist or be presented apart from the whole to which they belong; they cannot be detached. Also known as Nonindependent parts.
Examples of pieces are acorns and leaves and branches. They are parts of whole (a tree), but they also maintain an individual identity when separated from the tree.
Examples of moments are the color red, musical pitch, and vision. The color red cannot occur apart from some surface or spacial expanse. A musical pitch cannot exist except blended with sound, and vision without an eye. Moments can be spoken about, thanks to language, without making reference to its dependences, but they cannot exist alone. Once separated by speech or thouht, they become abstract.
Now for the interesting claim made by Sokolowski. He prefaces this claim by explaining how certain philosophical "problems" arise merely from mistaking moments for pieces. He then states:
People often take the mind to be a self-enclosed sphere, that is, a piece that can be separated from the worldly context to which it naturally and essentially belongs. Then they will ask how the mind can ever get outside itself and find out what is going on in the world. But the mind cannot be separated out this way; the mind is a moment to the world and the things in it; the mind is essentially correlated with its objects. There is no "problem of knowledge" or "problem of the external world," there is no problem about how we get to "extramental" reality, because the mind should never be separated from reality from the beginning (Sokolowski 25).
Now, I'm not entirely convinced of his claim that the "mind is a moment to the world" and I would like to see some backing for it, but I will deal with that issue specifically in an upcoming post.
For the present time, I would like to consider the epistemological implications of such a claim.
The idea that the mind is connected to the world, even more so than simply being able to intend with the world, is an interesting concept. That the mind is a part of the world, even a moment of the world... Where does one start with such a claim?
It seems that, if true, this claim proves wrong all relativism and the thinking of most modern philosophers that the only things that we can have knowledge of are those that are in our minds. By such, they say that we cannot know what is in the outside world. But if the mind is a moment of the world, then there is that steady connection-- that real connection between the mind and the world. A connection that Locke holds does not exist.
I wonder, too, what relation this has with the process of intellection or abstraction. Do these two theories go together? Do they compliment one another, or do they contradict?
How does a part interact with its whole?
I'd like to read more on "Parts and Wholes" in general. And I'd also like to find an argument for the claim that Sokolowski makes about the mind being a moment of the world. This is even more interesting than I originally thought it would be. I need to do some more research.
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