Pragmatism

William James offers a new notion of truth in his “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth.” In this essay, he argues for a pragmatic view of truth, as opposed to the intellectualist and absolutist view of truth. While this view certainly possesses inherent value, James falls into an interior contradiction which is problematic to his pragmatic conception of truth.

The pragmatic conception of truth accepts the intellectualist definition, namely that in order for an idea to be true there must be agreement between the idea and reality. James is careful to make an important distinction, however, particularly in the meaning of “agreement.” Intellectualists hold agreement to mean that an idea corresponds to an already existing, static reality. The pragmatists, however, would say that “true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify.”[1] By this James means that “truth happens to an idea, it becomes true, is made true by events.”[2] Essentially, truth is an idea played out experientially and proves to be useful. “The possession of truth, so far from being here an end in itself, is only a preliminary means toward other vital satisfactions.”[3]

Now, this view of truth is appealing because of its inherent applicability to real life. There is, however, what appears to be a major flaw in James’ thinking. He argues that in order for an idea to be true, it must be verifiable with experience and it must be useful. But what is it that judges a thing to have been verified or for a thing to be useful? Let me explain. An idea is, in of itself, neither true nor false. It is merely potentially true (for it has not yet been realized and therefore cannot be verified or proven useful). However, once this idea is carried out and as such actual experiences are consequent, it can be said to be true or false. The idea of a bridge connecting two pieces of land separated by a chasm of water is only said to be true once it is constructed and existing (and useful).

Yet, it seems that there is a difficulty within this line of reasoning, for again I ask, what is it that judges a thing to be verified? Is there not here an agreement between what exists (the bridge in reality) and the idea (the idea of a bridge)? Is not the bridge in reality being compared against the idea of bridge, previously thought by the thinker? This is not simply verification as James would see it; because this verification implies a judgment which will say that the experience corresponds correctly (or does not correspond correctly) with the idea previously thought. This judgment is precisely what pragmatists attempt to escape by defining truth as what “happens to an idea.”[4] Instead, it is a judgment as to whether or not the reality “copies” the idea.[5]

(There is also question as to whether or not an idea can really be said to be true or false, since once it has been “made true by events”[6] it technically no longer exists as an idea. It would merely be one experience that exists before it is experientially made true. It is one experience in a progress of experiences that leads to a reality. Unless, James would say that an idea exists even after the experience of it being thought, which would then imply a static and eternal conception of an idea.)

Further, pragmatism commits the error of all opponents of absolute truth: it makes a truth claim and by doing so, contradicts its own philosophy of truth. Pragmatism claims that what is true is what is useful.[7] This truth claim is an absolutist claim and it is a contradiction of James’ conception that truth must be experienced and verified. He has made an idea to be true, rather than merely potentially true (which, as argued before, still implies an intellectualist judgment between idea and reality).

Despite the inconsistencies within James’ philosophy of truth, he uncovers a valid concern on the intellectualist conception of truth as “essentially an inert static relation.”[8] He expounds, “When you’ve got your true idea of anything, there’s an end of the matter… you’re in possession, you have fulfilled your thinking destiny.”[9] What good is truth if it is merely a possession to be had and has no affect on our day to day lives? There must be a relation between truth and this world, truth must transcend and become, in a sense, pragmatic, ‘useful’. This problem is what leads James to argue the pragmatic conception of truth. However, I think there is a way to reconcile an absolute sense of truth and what is useful, although that is a topic for another paper.
[1] James, William. “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth.” 430.
[2] Ibid. 430
[3] Ibid. 431
[4] Ibid. 430
[5] This argument was inspired in part by John E. Russell. “Some Difficulties with the Epistemology of Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 15, No. 4. (Jul., 1906)
[6] Ibid. 430
[7] Ibid. 431
[8] Ibid. 430
[9] Ibid. 430